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REVIEWS 
should be used as the primary reference, they ought to be selected over a far 
wider range of topics and then linked together by the lecture method. The 
solution may be in a combination of the source material, the lecture, and the 
textual devices to broaden the range of study. 
Yet these criticisms cannot be made with assurance. Because American 
legal history is still so experimental, the most important aspect of Howe's 
book is its evidence that he, a skilled historian, has found for the moment at 
least a method satisfactory to himself of teaching in the field. Howe concedes 
in his preface that "some readers" may think his concentration on Massa- 
chusetts material "bespeaks the arid enthusiasm of an antiquarian." I confess 
to being such a reader, though doubtless Howe makes vivid in his classroom 
such items as his eight excerpts from the journals and papers of John Win- 
throp. If old Governor Winthrop could launch not only justice in Massa- 
chusetts in the 17th century, but also American legal history at Harvard in 
the 20th, he is perhaps worth dusting off. 
JOHN P. FRANKt 
THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL. By Julius Stone. Sydney: Associated General Publications Pty. 
Ltd., 1946. Pp. lxiv, 918. $15.00. 
IN the maze of currents and cross-currents that characterize contemporary 
writing on jurisprudence and legal philosophy there are not many points on 
which common agreement can be found. But one point on which representa- 
tives of the most widely disparate views might agree is that Julius Stone has 
provided us with the best general introduction to jurisprudence that has yet 
appeared in the English language. This is not to say that Stone has a keener 
mind or a more fertile imagination or a more felicitous style or a broader 
scholarship than Austin, Maine, Holmes or Pound. But jurisprudence, de- 
spite all the battle-cries and advertisements of the conflicting schools, is a 
cumulative enterprise like science or music. It is possible for a rational being 
to grasp the varied insights that Austin, Maine, Holmes, Pound, and many 
other original thinkers during the past two or three thousand years have con- 
tributed to our understanding of law. In science, it is not necessary to reject 
Euclidean geometry in order to make use of the non-Euclidean geometries of 
Riemann or Lobachewsky; we can, and do, use all three in different contexts. 
Just so, one may enjoy Bach and Wagner, or Homer and Swinburne, on the 
same evening. It is Stone's great merit that he has not accepted the popular 
picture of legal philosophy as a bad play wherein each actor kills off all his 
predecessors on the stage. Nor has Stone followed the practice made standard 
by his revered teacher and one time colleague, Roscoe Pound, of pigeon-holing 
each legal thinker within a particular century, country, and school, explaining 
how he got into that particular pigeon-hole, and passing on quickly to the next 
pigeon-hole. Rather, he has had the insight to appreciate the character of legal 
philosophy (and of philosophy generally) as a great cooperative human enter- 
t Associate Professor, Yale Law School. 
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prise stretching across many generations, a continuous and cumulative ex- 
ploration of possible perspectives through which life's many-faceted problems 
can be viewed. This quality of intellectual tolerance or catholicity that per- 
meates Stone's appreciation of what other thinkers have tried to say is rare 
enough in contemporary jurisprudence, and important enough for the juris- 
prudence of the future, to warrant more attention than any of the particular 
insights which brighten the 982 pages and 3,156 or more footnotes of this 
volume. 
At the heart of Mr. Stone's sanity is the appreciation that two people who 
use the same word are not always talking about the same thing. With the 
help of this simple logical perception, Stone is able to avoid wasting time on 
the standard pseudo-questions of comparative jurisprudence, e.g., "Which 
comes first, law or the state?" or "What is the true definition of law ?" He is 
able to appreciate that what Austin had to say about the difference between 
the commands of a sovereign and other modes of social control still makes 
good sense, and at the same time to appreciate Maine's or Ehrlich's explora- 
tion of the inter-relations between the many forms of social pressure that dif- 
ferent people have called "law". In all of Stone's account, one finds no rout- 
ing of a "natural law" school by a "historical" school, no destruction of 
"analytical" or "realistic" jurisprudence by a jurisprudence that is unanalyti- 
cal or unrealistic, no gobbling up of all previous schools by a "sociological" 
school. Instead, there is a full appreciation of the fact that many different 
questions may reasonably be asked about law, that one who searches for the 
historical origin of a rule has no business quarreling with somebody else who 
seeks to dissect its logical structure, and that neither of them has any right, 
on the basis of his own legal studies, to contradict somebody else who seeks 
to ascertain the justice or injustice of the rule or to measure the impact of the 
rule on society. Only when any of these scholars steps outside the province of 
his research to denounce as worthless or invalid the efforts of others to answer 
other questions does the possibility of logical contradiction emerge. And 
while such contradictory claims are sometimes made, and, when made, help to 
evaluate the character of the maker, they are not, after all, a substantial part 
of jurisprudence or philosophy. 
The synoptic vision that characterizes Stone's volume is not the superficial 
tolerance of an eclectic anthologist. Nor is it a neo-Hegelian attempt to show 
that every significant contribution to jurisprudence incorporates and replaces 
all prior thinking. What gives balance and sanity to this study is the recogni- 
tion that the house of jurisprudence contains many mansions. And what 
makes the appearance of this volume a prime event for lawyers and law 
teachers is that for the first time in more than a century a single person has 
brought together in a single treatise unsolved problems that face us in every 
special field of law-teaching and law-practice and has thrown some light upon 
the interconnections of these problems. It is not merely that the problems 
are thrown together within the binding of a single volume but that they are 
bound together by issues of logic, ethics, and social fact which a synoptic vi- 
sion has brought into clearer focus. A few sentences from Stone's discussion 
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of "controls" illustrates the way in which the fences between the schools 
break down when one seeks light, from whatever source, upon a serious 
problem. 
Lawyers are tempted . . . to relegate such discussions to "politics". 
It must, however, be insisted that if they are "politics" then the most 
renowned and well accepted juristic writings are also politics. If 
Professor Mannheim's thesis is "politics" (in the sense that it does 
not concern lawyers) then so must be Jeremy Bentham's reform pro- 
gramme which has, for a century, potently influenced the practical 
tasks of lawyers. However opposed their theses, the problem is the 
same. The view which opposes the extension of social control to- 
day is reasserting in the twentieth century context some main teach- 
ings of the Benthamite individualists. Such debates develop the 
classical juristic debates as to the nature of justice. The shades of 
Kant, and Hegel, and their collectivist prototypes Stammler and 
Kohler, of Bentham and his collectivist prototype, Ihering, haunt 
them. The contemporary debate, however, takes place in the fuller 
context of modern sociological inquiry. It touches the meaning of 
justice as seen by the light of hard-won understanding of the psy- 
chology and psycho-pathology of individuals and of social groups. 
The stress upon the dependence of law and justice on other social 
phenomena carries on the messages of Montesquieu, and of Savigny. 
The importance attributed to various types of social cohesion con- 
tinues Durkheim's and Duguit's analyses. The recognition of the 
non-rational in individual and social behaviour takes in on the phil- 
osophical side work like that of Kohler, Henri Bergson; and on the 
psychological side the insights of von Gierke, Tarde, Maitland and 
Dicey on the one hand, and of Freud, Le Bon, Pareto, Petrazycki on 
the other.' 
In an age of specialization when lawyers and law teachers know less and 
less about each other's work, this volume comes as a welcome invitation to 
cooperative thinking across party walls and party lines. Current problems in 
the law of torts, contract, property, and civil liberties are clarified by the ap- 
plication of insights which Stone has gathered from the literature of general 
jurisprudence. And the theoretical writings of Austin, Bentham, Savigny, 
Ihering, Maine, Holmes, Ehrlich, Pound, M. R. Cohen, Llewellyn, and Frank 
are equally clarified by Stone's application of them to new fields and current 
controversies. 
The usefulness of this volume as a springboard for such discussion and in- 
quiry is not lessened by the author's failure to offer pat and final answers to 
the perennial questions with which he deals. Indeed, the author's treatment 
of these problems strongly suggests that they are perennial precisely because 
they have more facets than many generations of observers can measure. This 
volume should be particularly useful as a textbook in jurisprudence at any 
law school that does not possess a final revelation which renders the study of 
1. P. 768. 
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other people's ideas useless. But its utility is not limited to courses in juris- 
prudence. I know very few law teachers who would not be better teachers of 
their own subjects for the reading of Stone's book. In particular it can help 
all of us to see that objectivity in legal science is attainable not by dismissing 
value judgments but by making our value judgments and their alternatives 
explicit. 
If it be true that every significant thinker exhibits the defects of his virtues, 
it may be said that the defect of Stone's virtue of tolerance for significant 
ideas is the respect he shows for high-sounding statements even when they are 
devoid of significant content. Repeatedly the words "with respect" trail 
along after his criticisms of pronouncements by distinguished writers that 
might better be charitably ignored. Copious references to deservedly for- 
gotten authors demonstrate the intensity of Mr. Stone's painstaking search 
for enlightenment in unlikely quarters. But though they add to the weight 
and cost of the volume, they hardly add proportionately to its utility. 
Perhaps a significant instance of this undue deference is the respect that 
Mr. Stone shows for the classification of "individual" and "social" interests 
developed by Pound, Bohlen, and others. No more than any of his prede- 
cessors does Mr. Stone explain how there can be a social interest that is not 
the interest of individuals. Instead of recognizing that any interest what- 
ever may be viewed from the standpoint of one individual or all individuals or 
some intermediate class, Mr. Stone classifies certain interests as essentially 
individual and others as essentially social. Thus the social interest of all of 
us in hearing and appraising unsound or unpopular ideas is subordinated in 
this analysis to the individual interest of the orator, as if the defense of free 
communication rested primarily on the satisfactions of the tongue. The "in- 
terest" analysis is particularly unwieldy when the arguments for "freedom of 
contract" are given in a chapter on individual interests and the arguments 
against "freedom of contract" are given in a chapter on social interests. And 
when problems of labor relations, industrial concentration, and human health 
are divided up among chapters on individual and social interests, all the 
King's horses and men could hardly put the problems together again. That 
Mr. Stone clearly recognizes the inadequacy of these classifications hardly 
improves matters.2 
Of course, in a volume of this magnitude, it is as easy as it is useless to 
pick out details for criticism. It might fairly be noted that although Stone is, 
quite apart from this volume, one of the outstanding original workers today 
in international law, and particularly in the international protection of mi- 
nority rights, he hardly does justice to Vitoria and other Catholic jurist- 
theologians in tracing the origins of international law and the idea of the 
rights of man. It might be remarked that he sometimes uses the word "syl- 
logism" without much regard for its traditional and dictionary meaning, and 
that he misses the simplicity of Hohfeld's fundamental idea of privilege as 
absence of legal restraint when he construes it as limited to those rare situa- 
2. See pp. 493-5. 
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tions where a man's conduct and third party interference with such conduct 
are both equally privileged.3 But of these and other like slips, it may fairly 
be said that none of the errors is original and that all of them together do not 
amount to much. 
Perhaps the most serious lapse from the high general standards of the 
volume arises in connection with the author's frequent use of the pejorative 
suffix "ism". When he discusses utility, ideas, individuals, and evolution, he 
is clear and objective. But, as is the case with other. writers, when the dis- 
cussion shifts to utilitarianism, idealism, individualism and evolutionism,4 the 
emotional overtones of the pejorative suffix introduce serious distortions. In 
this again, Mr, Stone's sin is not original but one of the besetting sins of our 
age. Indeed, it is the great virtue of this volume that it may help us over the 
caricatures that revolve about all our jurisprudential and non-jurisprudential 
isms and may help us to see that in jurisprudence, as elsewhere, "labels are 
libels." 
FELIX S. COHENt 
POWER AND PERSONALITY. By Harold D. Lasswell. New York: W. W. Nor- 
ton and Company, 1948. Pp. 255. 
THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH. By 
Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. Pp. ix, 
314. 
IN two recent books, one a collection of past essays, the other a series of 
lectures, Professor Lasswell presents a convenient synthesis of his major 
thinking in the field of politics. Despite the diversity of the articles, both 
works comprise a substantive and unified study in moral and political phil- 
osophy, and it is as such that they will be treated in this review. 
The major topics that I have selected for examination are among the most 
prominent in both books. They are interrelated, constituting the generic 
unity already referred to as moral and political philosophy. The sequential 
arrangement of treatment is one of convenience and not a ranking in order of 
importance. My list is as follows: (1) nature of science, particularly politi- 
cal science; (2) value; (3) modes of thought; (4) ordering of society. A 
regrouping is possible, substituting appropriate philosophical designations and 
varying with the particular philosophical perspective of the classifier. 
The response to such fundamental questions as what kind of science is 
politics, what is its proper object of study, what are its ends, what methods 
are appropriate, and how are these derived, determine what is studied, how it 
is studied and why. The decision denoting the kind of entity to be described 
as political is fundamental to political analysis and accounts for the multi- 
plicity of such systems. 
3. See pp. 120-1. Typically a privilege (e.g., of walking on the public highway) is 
backstopped by a right that others shall not interfere. 
4. See, e.g., pp. 652-3. 
t Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. 
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